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RED AND WHITE, BLACK AND BLUE: AN EXAMINATION OF 
THE SUPREME COURT’S RACIAL GERRYMANDERING 
JURISPRUDENCE FOLLOWING COOPER V. HARRIS 
On May 22, 2017, the United States Supreme Court found that the 
North Carolina state legislature improperly gerrymandered two congres-
sional districts by considering race as the predominant factor when re-
drawing district lines in 2011. Applying a “clearly erroneous” standard of 
review, the Court unanimously upheld the district court’s decision to strike 
down congressional district (CD) 1 but split 5-3 over the question of CD 
12. (Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision.) 
The case, Cooper v. Harris,1 marked the fifth time in the past twenty-
five years that the Supreme Court examined one or both of these districts.2 
In this case, the split over CD 12 arose from the defendants’ assertion that 
the changes to the district’s boundary lines were entirely partisan-driven 
and, therefore, lawful. That claim, combined with the plaintiffs’ failure to 
show how the state legislature could have achieved its partisan goals with-
out affecting the district’s overall black voter age population (BVAP) was 
enough to convince three of the Court’s conservative judges that the leg-
islature’s actions did not amount to racial gerrymandering.3 But in striking 
down CD 12, the majority made a departure from the “alternative ways” 
requirement4 laid out in a 2001 case, Easley v. Cromartie5 (commonly 
known as Cromartie II)—a departure which Justice Alito likened to the 
act of tossing away a napkin after a single use.6 
This Article will examine the Court’s legal explanations for its deci-
sions on CDs 1 and 12, with a particular focus on the majority’s departure 
from the Court’s earlier holding in Cromartie II. Lastly, this Article will 
explore some potential implications of that departure. 
  
 1. 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017). 
 2. Id. at 1472. 
 3. Justice Thomas sided with the Court’s four liberal justices in striking down both CDs, fol-
lowing his belief that no consideration of race should be permissible in redistricting (for CD 1) and 
emphasizing the Court’s strict application of the “clear error” standard of review (for CD 2). Cooper 
v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. at 1485 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Hans von Spakovsky, Symposium: The 
Goldilocks principle of redistricting, SCOTUSBLOG, (May 23, 2017, 4:43 PM), http://www.sco-
tusblog.com/2017/05/symposium-goldilocks-principle-redistricting/. 
 4. In Cromartie II, the Court laid out a requirement that plaintiffs in a racial gerrymandering 
claim must show that the legislature could have achieved its same political purposes in “alternative 
ways,” without such a disproportionate impact on the affected racial minority. Cromartie II, 532 U.S. 
234, 236 (2001). While Justice Alito refers to this requirement as the “counter-map requirement” in 
his dissent, in light of the Cromartie II Court’s lack of specificity for how such showing must be made 
(map or otherwise), this article will refer to the rule as the “alternative ways” requirement. 
 5. 532 U.S. 234 (2001). 
 6. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. at 1486 (Alito, J. dissenting). 
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PART I: A CAROLINIAN KERFUFFLE 
In March 2011, North Carolina state legislators set about the task of 
redrawing the state’s congressional district map.7 Data from the 2010 na-
tional census was in, revealing a population increase of nearly 1.5 million 
people in the state—a change of about 18.5%.8 This population increase 
prompted lawmakers to adjust the boundary lines, with a particular focus 
on two key districts—CD 1 and CD 12. The General Assembly undertook 
these changes for three reasons. First, the legislature needed to adjust dis-
trict lines in order to comply with the Constitution’s one-person, one-vote 
principle.9 Secondly, lawmakers purportedly acted under the perception 
that they were required to raise the BVAP in CD 1 in order to comply with 
§2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA).10 And finally, the Republican-con-
trolled General Assembly maintained an overarching goal of modifying 
the two CDs in order to secure a partisan advantage in the surrounding 
districts11—an endeavor that courts have consistently upheld as lawful.12 
  
 7. Timeline detailing North Carolina redistricting efforts and lawsuits, Ballotpedia, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Timeline_detailing_North_Carolina_redistricting_ef-
forts_and_lawsuits (last visited: June 1, 2017). 
 8. Paul Mackun and Steve Wilson, Population Distribution and Change: 2000 to 2010, U.S. 
Department of Commerce Economics and Statistics Administration U.S. Census Bureau, C2010BR-
01 March 2011. 
 9. Statement by Senator Bob Rucho and Representative David Lewis Regarding Proposed 
State Legislative Redistricting Plans (July 12, 2011), 
http://www.ncleg.net/GIS/Download/ReferenceDocs/2011/Joint%20Statement%
20by%20Senator%20Bob%20Rucho%20and%20Representative%20Da-
vid%20Lewis_7-12-11.pdf. States are required to “draw congressional districts with popula-
tions as close to perfect equality as possible.” Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1124 (2016). In-
deed, the Court agreed that CD 1 was “substantially underpopulated” by nearly 100,000 voters fol-
lowing the release of the 2010 census data. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1466 (U.S. 2017). On 
the other hand, CD 12 was overpopulated by about 3,000 people, leading the Court to the opposing—
if somewhat vague—conclusion that CD 12 “had no need for significant total-population changes.” 
Id. 
 10. Joint Statement of Senator Bob Rucho and Representative David Lewis regarding the re-
lease of Rucho-Lewis Congress 2 (July 19, 2011), http://www.ncleg.net/representa-
tion/Content/Process2011.aspx; see also Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1460 (U.S. 2017). 
It is important to note that the Court rejected the legislature’s reliance upon the VRA in this instance. 
However, in some contexts, § 2 may, in fact, “requir[e] drawing a majority-minority district” if certain 
preconditions establishing voter dilution are met. Id.; see also Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50–
51 (1986); 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a). 
 11. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. at 1473. 
 12. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 752 (1973) (“Politics and political considerations 
are inseparable from districting and apportionment.”); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 138 (1986) 
(“[T]he intentional drawing of district boundaries for partisan ends and for no other reason [does not 
violate] the Equal Protection Clause.”); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 968 (1996) (“[I]f the State's goal 
is otherwise constitutional political gerrymandering, it is free . . . to achieve that goal.”); Hunt v. 
Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 551 (1999) (“Our prior decisions have made clear that a jurisdiction may 
engage in constitutional political gerrymandering.”); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281, 124 S. Ct. 
1769, 1778, 158 L. Ed. 2d 546 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“[P]olitical gerrymandering claims are non-
justiciable.”) 
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After a period of public hearings and some legislative tinkering,13 the 
General Assembly approved a new district map in late July 2011.14 Among 
other changes, the new map packed a statistically significant number of 
black voters into CDs 1 and 12, having taken them from surrounding dis-
tricts.15 For decades, both CD 1 and CD 12 had been Democratic strong-
holds, and prior to the 2011 redistricting, both had encompassed a substan-
tial number of black voters, though African Americans remained a statis-
tical minority in each.16 The new map converted both districts into “ma-
jority-minority” districts.17 In CD 1, the BVAP rose from 48.6% to 
52.7%.18 In CD 12, the BVAP rose from 43.8% to 50.7%.19 By simply 
adjusting the district lines around a number of select neighborhoods, the 
North Carolina legislature effectively removed black voters from neigh-
boring competitive districts and packed them into fewer, majority-black 
districts—thereby diluting the voting power of black citizens across the 
state, an illegal and immoral practice. (Alternatively, the legislature re-
moved Democratic voters from neighboring competitive districts and 
packed them into fewer, majority-Democratic districts—thereby diluting 
Democratic voting power across the state, a perfectly legal, if “unsavory”20 
practice.) In a state whose black voters tend to favor Democratic candi-
dates at a rate of about 90%, the distinction can be “difficult” to ascertain.21 
On November 1, 2011, the U.S. Department of Justice granted pre-
clearance of the General Assembly’s new map, pursuant to the now-de-
funct Section 5 of the VRA.22 Two days later, several civil rights groups 
filed suit in North Carolina Superior Court, challenging the constitution-
ality of CDs 1 and 12.23 The map was upheld three times by state judicial 
bodies: first by a three-judge panel in superior court; then by the North 
Carolina Supreme Court (NCSC); and then by the NCSC again, after the 
U.S. Supreme Court vacated the earlier ruling and remanded the case in 
  
 13. Joint Statement of Senator Bob Rucho and Representative David Lewis regarding the re-
lease of Rucho-Lewis Congress 2 (July 19, 2011), http://www.ncleg.net/representa-
tion/Content/Process2011.aspx. 
 14. Timeline detailing North Carolina redistricting efforts and lawsuits, Ballotpedia, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Timeline_detailing_North_Carolina_redistricting_ef-
forts_and_lawsuits (last visited: June 1, 2017). 
 15. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. at 1461–62, 1475. 
 16. See id. at 1465–66. 
 17. See id. at 1468, 1474. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. at 1487 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 21. Id. at 1488 (citing polling data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research at Cor-
nell University, dating back to 2000); see also Cromartie II, 532 U. S., at 256. 
 22. Timeline detailing North Carolina redistricting efforts and lawsuits, Ballotpedia, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Timeline_detailing_North_Carolina_redistricting_ef-
forts_and_lawsuits (last visited: June 1, 2017). The Justice Department granted preclearance a 
second time, on December, 8, 2011, after the legislature made “technical corrections” to the July map. 
Id. 
 23. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. at 1467. 
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light of the Court’s then-recent decision in Alabama Legislative Black 
Caucus v. Alabama.24 Despite the on-going litigation in state court, two 
separate plaintiffs (North Carolina voters David Harris and Christine Bow-
ser, collectively Plaintiffs) brought action in federal district court.25 That 
path proved much more successful, as a different three-judge panel found 
both congressional districts unconstitutional.26 (Interestingly, that court 
also split over the question of CD 12.)27 Upon appeal, the Supreme Court 
affirmed the district court’s holding, as referenced above. 
The following is a depiction of all thirteen of North Carolina’s con-
gressional districts under the General Assembly’s 2011 map. Three 
districts (1, 4, and 12) are solidly Democratic, while the remaining ten 
are represented by Republicans. This map appeared as an appendix to 
the Court’s decision in Cooper v. Harris.28 Note: the General Assem-
bly did little to change the basic shape of either district in question in 
2011—both districts’ convoluted shapes were inherited from prior leg-




 24. Dickson v. Rucho, 368 N.C. 481, 485, 492 (2015), opinion modified on denial of reh'g, 368 
N.C. 673 (2016), and cert. granted, judgment vacated, No. 16-24, 2017 WL 2322831 (U.S. May 30, 
2017). 
 25. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. at 1466–68. 
 26. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. at 1466. 
 27. See Harris v. McCrory, 159 F. Supp. 3d 600, 636 (M.D.N.C. 2016), aff'd sub nom. Cooper 
v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455 (U.S. 2017). 
 28. See Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. at 1481. 
 29. See id. at 1496 (Alito, J. dissenting) (recounting how CD 12 was first draw along the I-85 
corridor in the early 1990s, with the express purposes of capturing a high concentration of black voters, 
and has changed little since that time); Joint Statement of Senator Bob Rucho and Representative 
David Lewis regarding the release of Rucho-Lewis Congress 2 (July 19, 2011), 
http://www.ncleg.net/representation/Content/Process2011.aspx (describing CD 1 as 
“inherited” from prior General Assemblies). 
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PART II: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 
A. CD 1 Fails Strict Scrutiny 
The Court’s decision on CD 1 was not particularly controversial. As 
early as June 2011, the state publicly vocalized its position that race was a 
primary consideration in how the new lines would be drawn: “The Chairs 
[of the Joint House and Senate Redistricting Committee] believe that . . . 
North Carolina remains obligated by federal and state law to create major-
ity African American districts,” NC Senator Bob Rucho and NC Repre-
sentative David Lewis announced in one public statement.30 Dr. Thomas 
Hofeller (a professional political map-maker hired by the General Assem-
bly) testified that the legislature plainly and openly instructed him to draw 
CD 1 as “a majority black district.”31 The State’s defense rested upon the 
argument that the VRA compelled the legislature to draw CD 1 as a ma-
jority-minority district, due to concerns about majority bloc voting along 
racial lines.32 Regardless of the reason, however, in any instance where 
race is “the predominant factor motivating the legislature’s [redistricting] 
decision[s],”33 the courts will apply strict scrutiny—asking whether the 
“race-based sorting of voters serves a ‘compelling interest’ and is ‘nar-
rowly tailored.’”34 
Notably, the Court has upheld the notion that compliance with the 
VRA may constitute a compelling interest and that “race-based districting 
is narrowly tailored to that objective if a State had ‘good reasons’ for think-
ing that the Act demanded” it.35 However, under application of the Thorn-
burg v. Gingles36 test (a threshold analysis used to prove vote dilution), the 
North Carolina General Assembly struggled mightily to show that CD 1 
was in danger of any such dilution. As a longtime stronghold for Demo-
cratic candidates, CD 1 has consistently operated as a “cross-over” district, 
where “members of the majority help a ‘large enough’ minority to elect 
[the minority’s] candidate of choice.”37 Thus, the State failed to provide 
evidence of the type of racialized bloc voting the VRA was designed to 
protect against. 
  
 30. Joint Statement by Senator Bob Rucho, Chair of the Senate Redistricting Committee, and 




 31. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. at 1468. 
 32. Id. at 140–71. 
 33. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995). 
 34. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. at 1464 (citing Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 
137 S. Ct. 788, 801(2017)). 
 35. Id. at 1469. 
 36. 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
 37. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. at 1470. 
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With no “good reason” for the racially motivated changes, then, the 
Court unanimously invalidated the impermissibly drawn district.  
B. An Evidentiary Fight over CD 12 
District 12 is a different story. Here, the State claimed that the district 
was modified for wholly partisan purposes; hence, race was not the pre-
dominant factor and strict scrutiny need not apply. Defendants conceded 
that the State was mindful of race but clarified that the disenfranchisement 
of CD 12’s voters was motivated by partisanship, not racism.38 Divining 
the legislature’s true intent is a question of fact, and in this case, the State’s 
facts failed to carry the day. 
At trial, Plaintiffs provided particularly damning documentary and 
testimonial evidence that revealed the legislature’s plan to raise CD 12’s 
BVAP to exceed 50% in just the same way as CD 1.39 Plaintiffs admitted 
public documents released by Rucho and Lewis prior to the map’s imple-
mentation, declaring the increase in CD 12’s BVAP was to “ensure pre-
clearance” by the Department of Justice.40 Congressman Mel Watt (the 
longtime representative of District 12) recounted a conversation with 
Rucho in which Rucho articulated the Republican “leadership[‘s]” intent 
to increase the BVAP and Rucho’s responsibility “to go and convince the 
African–American community” that the plan “made sense.”41 
The State, by contrast, offered unpersuasive assurances to the con-
trary. While testifying for the defense, Dr. Hofeller conceded that race was 
“perhaps” a factor in one particular county—incidentally, about 25,000 of 
the district’s 35,000 new voters were black voters from that county.42 Upon 
such disparate evidentiary showings, the district court agreed with Plain-
tiffs that race predominated the legislature’s decisions in CD 12 the same 
way it had in CD 1. 
C. Counter-Map Catch-22 
Upon appeal, the Supreme Court reviewed the lower court’s decision 
for clear error. Finding the district court’s factual determinations “[e]mi-
nently reasonable,” the majority upheld the lower court’s decision and 
ruled CD 12 unconstitutional.43 Unfortunately, in so doing, the Court im-
mediately found itself at odds with another of its own precedents—that is, 
  
 38. “Federal law permits (and sometimes requires) states to consider race when drawing district 
lines, but . . . the Constitution bars states from making race the predominant factor when drawing 
districts.” Amy Howe, Argument analysis: Lots of questions, no easy answers in redistricting cases, 
SCOTUSBLOG, (Dec. 5, 2016, 10:42 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/12/argu-
ment-analysis-lots-of-questions-no-easy-answers-in-redistricting-cases/ (emphasis 
added). 
 39. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. at 1476. 
 40. Id. at 1475. 
 41. Id. at 1476. 
 42. Id. at 1477. 
 43. Id. at 1466 (quoting dissenting district court Judge Osteen) (internal citations omitted). 
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the “alternative ways” requirement laid out in Cromartie II. In that case, 
the Supreme Court was (remarkably enough) reviewing the 1997 version 
of North Carolina’s congressional district 12.44 Writing for the majority, 
Justice Breyer then stated:  
[W]here majority-minority districts (or the approximate equivalent) 
are at issue and where racial identification correlates highly with po-
litical affiliation, the party attacking the legislatively drawn boundaries 
must show at the least that the legislature could have achieved its le-
gitimate political objectives in alternative ways that are comparably 
consistent with traditional districting principles. That party must also 
show that those districting alternatives would have brought about sig-
nificantly greater racial balance.45 
In that review of CD 12, the Court was faced with a strikingly similar 
fact-pattern to the instant case—an allegation of racial gerrymandering; an 
explanation by the legislature that politics, not race, drove the redistricting; 
evidence demonstrating lawmakers’ consideration of race in drawing the 
lines; and a three-judge panel finding for the plaintiffs at the district court 
level.46 In that instance and under the same “clearly erroneous” standard 
of review, however, the Court overturned the lower court’s findings, stat-
ing that the plaintiffs must show “at the least” that the legislature could 
have achieved its political purposes with “significantly greater racial bal-
ance.”47 The Court did not indicate how strictly or loosely that requirement 
would be interpreted. Nevertheless, some form of statistical and demo-
graphic analysis appears necessary. 
In Cooper, the majority went to great lengths to try and distinguish 
the 2011 version of CD 12 from its 1997 predecessor, focusing its efforts 
on narrowing the interpretation of Justice Breyer’s language above. Un-
fortunately, these efforts fell flat, as Justice Kagan employed a series of 
straw-man tactics (and a hint of snark) that conveniently ignored the mess-
iness of the Court’s current gerrymandering jurisprudence. “If the 
[Cromartie II] Court had adopted [the alternative ways] rule,” she wrote 
in Cooper, “it would have had no need to weigh each piece of evidence in 
the case . . . [b]ut that is exactly what Cromartie II did, over a span of 20 
pages and in exhaustive detail . . . All that careful analysis would have 
been superfluous—that dogged effort wasted—if the Court viewed the ab-
sence or inadequacy of a single form of evidence as necessarily dooming 
a gerrymandering claim.”48 According to Kagan, the problem in Cromartie 
II was that the plaintiffs simply failed to be persuasive. “Hence emerged 
  
 44. Cromartie II, 532 U.S. at 237. 
 45. Id. at 236. 
 46. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. at 1486 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also Cromartie II, 532 U.S. 
at 237–41. 
 47. Cromartie II, 532 U.S. at 236. 
 48. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. at 1481. 
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the demand quoted above,” she said, “for maps that would actually show 
what the plaintiffs' had not.”49 
Of course, the Cromartie II Court was neither as flippant in its lan-
guage nor as simplistic in its ruling as now construed. The actual rule the 
Court attempted to emplace in 2001 demanded that the plaintiff in a racial 
gerrymandering claim show that the legislature could have achieved its 
same political purposes without so great an impact on the racial minority. 
In a world where partisan gerrymandering remains a protected activity, 
such a rule seems to make sense.50 The Court did not require demonstra-
tion in map-form, but the requirement for demonstration was there, none-
theless. A fundamental fact in Cooper is that Plaintiffs made no such 
showing.51 Thus, while Plaintiffs successfully demonstrated that the State 
was, indeed, motivated by certain racial considerations, it failed to meet 
(or even address) the Cromartie II “alternative way” requirement.52 As 
such, the Court was on a collision-course with its own precedent. Unfor-
tunately, the Court’s prevarications on the issue delivered a supremely un-
satisfying resolution. 
PART III: IMPLICATIONS 
The Cromartie II alternative ways requirement undoubtedly elevated 
the plaintiffs’ burden in racial gerrymandering claims. Within the context 
of Cromartie II, however, such an additional requirement made a certain 
kind of sense.53 In removing that requirement, the Court has made it easier 
for other, future plaintiffs to bring racial gerrymandering suits. Right or 
wrong, this about-face belies the bemusing nature of the Court’s current 
gerrymandering jurisprudence. Such disorder could hardly come at a row-
dier time. At present, Republicans and Democrats have budgeted a com-
  
 49. Id. 
 50. See id. at 1490 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[I]f a court mistakes a political gerrymander for a 
racial gerrymander, it illegitimately invades a traditional domain of state authority, usurping the role 
of a State's elected representatives. This does violence to both the proper role of the Judiciary and the 
powers reserved to the States under the Constitution.”) 
 51. See Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1477–1478 (summarizing the opinion of Plaintiff’s expert 
that race predominated the legislature’s decision making, but failing to address whether the legislature 
could have achieved its same partisan goals with greater racial balance). 
 52. Andrew Brasher, Symposium: A recipe for continued confusion and more judicial involve-
ment in redistricting, SCOTUSBLOG (May 23rd, 2017 1:08 PM), http://www.sco-
tusblog.com/2017/05/symposium-recipe-continued-confusion-judicial-involve-
ment-redistricting/; see Alan Morrison, Response, Cooper v. Harris: Striking Down Racial Ger-
rymandering in North Carolina, GEO. WASH. L. REV. ON THE DOCKET (May 30, 2017), 
http://www.gwlr.org/cooper-v-harris/. 
 53. See Cromartie II, 532 U.S. at 257 (describing the plaintiff’s burden of proof as “demanding” 
and exhorting district courts to exercise “‘extraordinary caution’ [in such cases] . . . to avoid treading 
upon legislative prerogatives”) (quoting Justice O’Connor’s concurrence and the majority opinion, 
respectively, from Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 928 (1995)). 
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bined $190 million for implementation of their 2020 redistricting cam-
paigns.54 No doubt, an already elbows-deep judiciary is poised to sink yet 
further into the tar baby.55 
The fact of the matter is this: in an age of identity politics, racial ger-
rymandering and partisan gerrymandering have all but converged. “Party 
affiliation and voting patterns are . . . almost everywhere correlated to 
race,” wrote Anita Earls, Executive Director of the Southern Coalition for 
Social Justice.56 Even the Court has acknowledged this reality—more than 
once.57 But until the Court adopts (and maintains) an effective way to dif-
ferentiate between racism and partisanship in redistricting, the Court is 
bound to find itself playing host to a protracted and draining political war. 
With the Court scheduled to tackle the issue of partisan gerrymandering 
later this fall,58 voters and legislatures could be in for a fresh dose of clar-
ity—or, alternatively, more tar baby. 




 54. Elizabeth Kolbert, Drawing the Line: How redistricting turned America from blue to red, 
THE NEW YORKER (June 27, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/maga-
zine/2016/06/27/ratfcked-the-influence-of-redistricting.  
 55. See Andrew Brasher, Symposium: A recipe for continued confusion and more judicial in-
volvement in redistricting, SCOTUSBLOG (May 23rd, 2017 1:08 PM), http://www.sco-
tusblog.com/2017/05/symposium-recipe-continued-confusion-judicial-involve-
ment-redistricting/ (“[T]he court’s decision on CD 12 seems destined to lead to more judicial 
involvement in redistricting.”). 
 56. Anita Earls, Symposium: Bringing sanity to racial-gerrymandering jurisprudence, SCO-
TUSblog (May 23rd, 2017, 5:32 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/05/symposium-
bringing-sanity-racial-gerrymandering-jurisprudence/ (heralding the Cooper decision as 
a portent of “sanity” in the Court’s recent gerrymandering jurisprudence). Ms. Earls also serves as 
plaintiff’s counsel in two pending racial gerrymandering cases and one partisan gerrymandering case 
in North Carolina. Id. 
 57. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. at 1473 (“[O]f course, “‘racial identification is highly correlated 
with political affiliation.’”) (citing Cromartie II, 532 U.S. at 243). 
 58. Docket for 16-1161, U.S. Supreme Court, https://www.su-
premecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docketfiles/16-1161.htm (last visited: June 
13, 2017); see also Scott Bomboy, A landmark gerrymandering case heading toward the Court’s next 
term, CONSTITUTION DAILY (April 25, 2017), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/a-land-
mark-gerrymandering-case-heading-toward-the-courts-next-term.  
